ISME

International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry

UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS
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Department of Philosophy,
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**International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry (ISME)
8th Annual Conference**

Tradition, Modernity, and Beyond

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

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National and Kapodistrian
University of Athens**

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

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ABSTRACTS

Beadle Ron

Craft Consciousness:
Resisting Modernity in the Name of Practice

Alasdair MacIntyre maintains both that practices require institutions for their sustenance and improvement and that the pursuit of external goods by institutions represents an on-going threat to the integrity of practices (MacIntyre 2007: 194). It follows that practitioners should participate in the politics of their institutions in a way which both requires and develops the virtues as:

> "The virtues which we need in order to achieve both our own goods and the goods of others … only function as genuine virtues when their exercise is informed by awareness of how power is distributed and of the corruptions to which its use is liable. Here as elsewhere in our lives we have to learn how to live both with and against the realities of power." (MacIntyre 1999, p. 102)

There are a number of preconditions for engaging in such institutional politics well and in this paper I will explore the pivotal role of what I will call craft consciousness. The paper will model this concept as requiring (i) identification of the goods internal to a particular practice (ii) according an appropriate valuation to the pursuit of these goods in the context of others and (iii) awareness of both the succor and the threat that institutions pose to practices.

I will argue that those practitioners who are armed with such consciousness are better to equipped to engage in the work of both constructing and conflicting with institutions than others. To make this case the paper will use a range of illustrations of living with and against the realities of power. In particular it will draw on evidence of the developing consciousness and political activism of circus artists in the protection of their craft and community.

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Bielskis Andrius

Structures of Meaning:
A Neo-Aristotelian Re-articulation of the Question
of the Meaning of Being

This paper is a part of a bigger philosophical project on the meaningfulness of human practices and activities which give shape and meaning to human lives. The

paper's underlying presupposition is inspired by Alasdair MacIntyre's philosophical project of *After Virtue*: namely that human life, our quest for meaning should be understood and philosophically articulated in terms of Aristotelian teleology. Thus Martin Heidegger's project *Sein und Zeit*, the project of posing the question of the meaning of being, despite its magnitude and seriousness, should be rearticulated in terms of the Neo-Aristotelian conception of 'structures of meaning'. The paper will aim to articulate the conception of 'structures of meaning' drawing its parallel with MacIntyre's notion of 'practice'.

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Boukouras Efstathios
Tassopoulou Maria

Towards a New Paradigm:
Deconstructing Modernism and Post-Modernism
Through Thomas Kuhn

Modernism refers to modern views, thought and practice and arose as a reaction to the conservative values of tradition as a whole; a set of ideas that encompasses the beliefs and practices of those who felt that "traditional" forms of art, architecture, literature and social organization were detached from reality and outdated. Ideas and ideologies emerged rapidly, often conflicting with each other, in order to explain the new world and finally [re]shape it to a new timeless and ecumenical form. The modern world is more a complex of ideas, which, unlike any preceding culture, prefers to reside in the future, rather than the present.

The acceptance of Modernism may reveal the two different components in the heart of the movement; the elitism that artists, philosophers and architects produce through their work versus their effort to recommend a more viable society, one that apply more to human needs. The failure of convergence of these two ideal situations testifies a flaw in the movement. The convergent and not the divergent thought is the prerequisite to radical changes to the core of the modern thought.

Thomas Kuhn described such radical changes in history as a "paradigm shift". Kuhn observes that progress occurs only when the previous state of affairs is abandoned and surpassed by new one. During this shift, paradigm meanings and axioms, transform in such level that we can no longer rationally connect the two theories. A change requires the crisis and presupposes the deconstruction of existing ideas. Given that we are in the middle of gushing changes at both social and moral field it is safe to assume that we live the Kuhn's stage of crisis. However,

there is not yet a revolution that will produce the upcoming. Post-modernism so far has failed to distinguish enough, to become something more than what is not "Modern". In general, it consists of extreme diverse and dissimilar conceptual structures that so far not seem to bear sufficient dynamic to produce a compelling framework, a new paradigm. Deconstructionism as a philosophical movement fulfills the intellectual reaction towards modern rationality and defines the very limits of Postmodernism itself.

Accepting Aristotle's theory of "οὗ ἕνεκα", i.e. the need to achieve the true understanding of objects, we ought to form new theories that fit best reality. Understanding crisis as a world without cohesion, as a language without syntax, we seek the new paradigm, as the common language that signifies the transition into a new world.

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Calvert   Anita

The Virtue of Courage
In the Philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre

Aim of this research is in understanding the contemporary virtue of courage. The general outline of Alasdair MacIntyre's virtue ethics and philosophy of work will represent a fundamental theoretical framework for analysing the content of the concept of courage and defining the conditions of courageous action. Alasdair MacIntyre provides a new scheme and specifically defines the key requirements to achieve any virtue: practice, narrative unity and tradition, insofar each of them assumes following of a certain goods (goods of practices, good which unifies the narratives of personal lives, goods of tradition). Therefore, courageous actor gains its clear orientation and justification of his/hers actions.

In analogy with MacIntyre's analysis of the virtue of justice in the book *Whose justice, which rationality?* it might be noteworthy to try to understand another fundamental virtue as courage in different traditions (Aristotelian, Thomistic, Humean...Liberalism). As tradition could not survive without the disciplining the virtue of courage in its practices, so the practises, as well as the unity of the personal life narratives depend on courageous habitus.

Although MacIntyre gives explicate but short definition of courage as "*ability to endure and ability to confront the harms*" in the book *Whose justice, which rationality?* in these arguments will be presented that *the second definition* of (any) 'virtue' in the book *After virtue* describes even more closely what the courage is (and even more than any other virtue). In his numerous papers one can find a

fruitful inspiration for a thoughts about the courage, but here it will be also, particularly emphasized the understanding of courage in relation to more profound understanding of virtue in the book *Dependent, rational animals*. Hence, courage can be interpreted only as an individual act based on an independent reasoning and acknowledge dependence on others, whereas the sources of courageous actions are concerns for others. With that we will make a space for discussion on how those concerns relate to the person's ability to confront and endure the harms in order to achieve the goods of excellence in the practices of community or how they can be consistent with our own ends and endings.

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Christian Richard

A MacIntyrean Account of Authenticity

Recent work in the human enhancement debate has revived discussion of the concept of authenticity. Authenticity is taken to be a central human virtue which is potentially under threat by certain forms of cognitive-enhancement such as memory editing and memory improvement. More generally, the concept of authenticity has been invoked in the shift away from substantive conceptions of welfare in ethics: a 'worthwhile life' might thus be given a formal account in terms of the self-consciously free and independent authorship of the values that guide one's life, or in the integrity of so acting that one's action is consonant with the value-set one endorses, or with whatever it is that constitutes one's 'true self'. While the former provided the thrust of the existentialist ethic for Heidegger and Sartre, the latter has been central to more recent analytic conceptions. Authenticity was also central to Bernard Williams' critique of consequentialism.

In this paper I show that there are problems for all existing accounts of authenticity: in various ways all accounts fail to give proper place to the importance of community-embeddedness and recognition. I argue that must draw on the concepts of practices and public reasoning and recognition developed by MacIntyre to develop a communitarian account of authenticity. Central to an understanding of authenticity is the role of recognition. Essential to being a certain kind of person is being recognised as such: it is having one's actions and achievements independently verified against the objective standards that are internal to the practice or community within which one participates, and that embodies the values that one wishes to realise in life. The kind of person someone wishes to be, and the values they choose partly constitute their private identity. The question of whether they are such people, of whether the 'public' identities they forge in the totality of their

acts and achievements are consonant with those values, is a question that will be settled through a process of dialogue and rationalisation, and by the independent public judgement of competent members of those practices. To establish whether a life is authentic, an agent's actions must be submitted to the test of public reason over their consonance with the agent's declared values. On a MacIntyrean account, Authenticity is not pace Sartre etc. about independence from the pressures social life, it is rather a matter of opening up one's values and actions to public scrutiny.

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Chu Irene

How a Confucian Tradition
Influences the Impact of Modernity in Taiwan

Whereas MacIntyre's concept of tradition emphasises the stabilising nature of historical and social contexts, the concept of modernity can be argued to highlight the impact of change. Using a three-pillar framework of the institutional environment, proposed by Scott (2014), this paper investigates whether concepts from Institutional theory can assist in the analysis of the tension between tradition and change. Scott's regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive pillars provide a framework which can be used to explore the forces on institutions, and the author contends that, in this way, the historical and social contexts embodied by tradition can be investigated. These pillars are not distinct, but rather form a continuum so that tradition can be argued to be comprised of more apparent elements from the regulative and normative pillars across to more unconscious elements from the cultural-cognitive pillar. Furthermore, the role played by change can then also be allowed for and contending institutional logics can be examined. In order to provide examples, the author's current doctoral research on organizational virtue in Taiwan is used to consider how a Confucian tradition has interacted with the impact of change. The deep-rooted nature of this relationship-based tradition, which emphasises collectivism, harmony, the doctrine of the mean, filial piety and a hierarchical order, results in a relatively stable social structure which is at the same time open to economic change. Using comparisons between Taiwan and other countries, aspects of the institutional environment, including historical and social factors, are shown to contribute to a uniquely Taiwanese tradition. This tradition plays an important part in shaping the environment in which organisational agents react to aspects of modernity and so reinforces theories of divergent capitalism.

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Concu Nicoletta

Is MacIntyre's Philosophy a Kind of Realism?

The MacIntyre's reply to the failure of the Enlightenment project has been labeled itself as a form of relativism by a good part of his critics. This point seems shared both by English and Italian critics. According to this issue, if the MacIntyre's aim was to find a solution to the failure of the Enlightenment project, the he would have failed. He would not reply carefully to relativism and perspectivism. He would not be able to build a convincing theory that escapes relativism and perspectivism, "the protagonist of post-Enlightenment" (WJWR, p. 353), but he would be a relativist thinker.

Now the point is to show how it is possible to avoid this vicious circle. MacIntyre exhibits and faces this issue in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. He is fully aware that his inquiry method and the theory on which that method is grounded have to overcome both the relativist challenge and the perspectivist challenge, that represent the only possible alternative since "the Enlightenment conceptions of truth and rationality cannot be sustained" (WJWR, p.353). To answer the relativist and perspectivist challenges MacIntyre, on his later writings, appeals to Thomism's synthesis that allows to overcome the failures of modernity. By this token, he develops a concept of tradition as an intellectual inquiry, as a background within which it is possible to explain the authentic meaning of the correspondence theory of truth where the first principles that lead the intellectual inquiry have got a capital role.

The MacIntyre's effort is thereby to connect his historical inquiry with the Thomism's metaphysics. It would seem then that MacIntyre's philosophy can place within the realism position that it has developed as reaction to post-modernity.

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Costanzo M. Jason

Methodology, Ontology and Morality

Within this essay and presentation I offer a contemporary examination of the methodological affinities that holds between ontology and moral science through consideration and reinterpretation of the concept of "convertibility" as first conceived within the ethical works of Aristotle and later among the medieval scholastics. According to this view, to say that "x is" and "x is good" is to assert not a real

but only a conceptual distinction inasmuch as both terms are mutually interchangeable (convertible) with respect to the subject itself. Following this, I consider whether convertibility implies merely a formal, terminological relationship, or else whether there are not more fundamental methodological affinities that result from this relationship. A number of questions result: First, what is the relationship between being and the good classically construed? Second, in broader terms, what is the methodological contribution of ontology to moral science? Third, what is the contribution of moral science to ontology? Finally, do these more specific methodological affinities point to a broader methodological unity at ground to the whole of human knowledge as such? As will be discussed, although the scholastic notion of convertibility offers a number of interesting insights into the formal structure of that which is, it nonetheless conceals, while offering a hint toward, a more fundamental methodological unity that awaits further examination. This relationship is analyzed and the deeper interconnections at ground to ontology, moral science and indeed the whole of human knowledge as such is brought forth for initial consideration.

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Devine Philip

Politics After MacIntyre

MacIntyre is known for his root-and-branch rejection of liberalism (which includes many the political philosophies called *conservative*), he synthesizes Left and Right critiques of liberalism. I trace the background of MacIntyre's position, and ask what the practical consequences of its acceptance might be. I conclude that MacIntyre requires a form of liberalism, to protect the communities of virtue he advocates against interference by other communities and the secular state.

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Dinić Rastislav

MacIntyre, Rawls and Cavell on Games, Rules and Practices

John Rawls and Alasdair Macintyre are usually represented as two opposing figures in the now famous dispute between liberals and communitarians, and for a

good reason – MacIntyre has criticized Rawls in several of his most important works, as a typical representative of modern liberal thought. In my paper, however, I intend to look at the two thinkers from a different angle, especially in regards of their view of practices, rules and games. In order to do that I will (following Stephen Mulhall and Peter Dula) introduce another interlocutor into their conversation – American philosopher Stanley Cavell. As I will show, Cavell's influential criticism of Rawls' influential early paper, "Two Concepts of Rules", in his book *A Claim of Reason*, in many respects resembles MacIntyre's critique of Rawls – like MacIntyre, Cavell points out the formal or contractual character in which Rawls thinks about morality, and situates this way of thinking in the terms of rationalization of modern society and the domination of *Gesellschaft* over *Gemeinschaft*. But unlike MacIntyre, he does not think that the solution to this ailment lies in returning to more substantial forms of community, rather in recognizing a different form of rationality that applies to morality – one that allows for reasonable disagreement and focuses on taking responsibility for one's position in a moral dispute. One of the most important targets of his criticism is Rawls' comparison of moral practices, such as promising, to games, such as baseball. This line of criticism, however, applies not only to Rawls, but also to MacIntyre (and has actually been put in somewhat similar terms, by Martha Nussbaum, in her review of *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*). In a passage from WJWR, MacIntyre approvingly describes the Aristotelian conception of rational agency, by comparing a rational agent to a hockey player "in the closing seconds of a crucial game has an opportunity to pass to another member of his or her team better placed to score a needed goal. Necessarily, we may say, if he or she has perceived and judged the situation accurately, he or she must immediately pass." But, according to Cavell this kind of equating of moral life with clearly and unambiguously structured practices such as games, is a mistake, and exactly the kind of mistake Rawls is guilty of. As I intend to show, there are some problems and incoherencies in MacIntyre's conception (particularly regarding the situation of the modern, "homeless", or rather "traditionless" individual) which might be resolved by Cavell's conception of rational moral disagreement.

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Erinakis Nikolaos

The Conflict of Autonomy and Authenticity
and their Different Roles in our Moral Thought

Contemporary theories of autonomy either do not distinguish between authenticity and autonomy or else they consider the former a necessary condition for the latter. Some of the most crucial problems that are raised regarding the concepts of authenticity and autonomy come from the fact that we have not paid enough attention to the distinction between them and to the different role that each of them plays in regard to ourselves. It is my view that not only autonomy should not be equated with authenticity, but also the latter should not operate as a necessary condition for the former, since in many cases they directly conflict. In this paper I focus on discussing different types of conflicts, i.e. conflicts between different authentic attitudes and conflicts between authenticity and autonomy. I begin by underlying that authenticity may be irrelevant or even conflicting to autonomy and that autonomy needs to be understood in its own terms. I argue that autonomy is a normative concept, which should be used for regulating permissible and impermissible actions, while authenticity is a descriptive concept, which nevertheless is morally good. Thus, based on the distinction between the ideas of Right and Good, I maintain that the promotion of authenticity is morally good, while respect for autonomy is morally right. While I explore autonomy as a constraint in the pursuit of authenticity by discussing case studies in Bioethics, I conclude that in the majority of the cases, we should respect the autonomous decision even if it goes against the authentic one. Nevertheless, I also explore in depth the notion of authenticity in the cases of non-autonomous patients. My account intends to help and propose how to treat people that even though may not be competent for autonomy, they may be authentic. I examine in which cases we should respect in terms of regulation the autonomous desire, decision or action of a person, despite the fact that her authentic one might be different and in which we should not. However, I claim that the ideal society would be one in which the autonomous attitudes are equated with the authentic attitudes and thus we should aim at developing social structures that promote authenticity, since a good and flourishing human life is one that is to some extent authentic.

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Erkan Balci Elif Nur

MacIntyre's Hume:
A Critique for Morality in Modern Thought

David Hume is known as a central philosophical figure in transition to modernity. He, as a philosopher of the Scottish Enlightenment, re-formulated the philosophy of morality, detaching the reason from the sphere of morality, and laid the foundations of an emotion-based morality. With the words of MacIntyre, as a decisive critic of Enlightenment and Modernity, Hume repudiates a 'religious foundation for morality' and puts 'in its place a foundation in human needs, interests, desires, and happiness' (Is/Ought, p. 464).This new moral sketch also established a framework for the morality of modernity. As a strong critique of modernity and its conception of morality, MacIntyre makes Hume a central villain in his narrative of problems in attempts to seek a ground for ethics in the individual.

For MacIntyre, Hume's problem, like other leading modern thinkers seeking rational principles for human behavior, is to explain morality with a reference to passions of individual. David Hume "insists that there is nothing to judgments of virtue and vice except the expression of feelings of approval and disapproval" (After Virtue, p. 268). By arguing this, Hume denies any external criteria out of individuals' own desires, interests, and needs for moral judgments. According to MacIntyre, this understanding of morality is a corrupt and failed project and Hume is one of the most valuable figures in this moral devolution. In this regard, MacIntyre constructs his understanding of morality upon the criticism of Hume. For that reason, to understand Hume properly is crucial for MacIntyre.

This paper has two aims: First is to describe the views of Hume on morality and his departure points from Aristotelian morality such as re-definition of practical reasoning and re-definition of virtue. Second is to clarify that how and on what bases MacIntyre criticizes Hume. These can provide us an explicit picture of MacIntyre's Hume in particular and his criticism of Enlightenment in general.

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Fattah Ahmad

Is There a Tension Between MacIntyre's Position as a Thomist and his Historical Account of Tradition-guided Moral Inquiry?

In this paper I will examine MacIntyre's account of the development in moral philosophy as grounded in a 'tradition' of inquiry, a view that is elaborated in his major works. I analyze his account of tradition and consider whether there is some essential tension in MacIntyre's project.

I will briefly provide the background for the discussion by reviewing MacIntyre's project of tradition-guided moral inquiry. I will specifically look at two objections by John Haldane, which assess MacIntyre's account of morality constituted in tradition. Haldane's first criticism is (a) because MacIntyre tells us there is a fundamental fragmentation in the language of morality, it is not clear how this fragmentation allows reconciliation of our ethical conversation, and so in some sense MacIntyre's project capitulates to a form of relativism. Here MacIntyre can show that historical progress within tradition-guided moral inquiry is possible, hence he need not accept that his project entails the type of relativism that Haldane worries about. Haldane's second worry derives from the first and can be roughly put this way (b) there is an inherent tension between MacIntyre's own espousal of Thomism as a tradition that he supports, and his socio-historical account of tradition-guided inquiry. The way that Haldane himself puts this second worry is that the latter is in some sense relativist, while the former is realist and so they are incompatible. Taken in this form, I believe that MacIntyre can answer the objection, using different strategies that reduce the realist's worries. But there is perhaps a deeper issue here, which is harder to resolve: namely, the suitability of MacIntyre's Thomist revival as it stands, given that it corresponds to the particular historical circumstance and social context of Aquinas and Aristotle, and its corresponding conception of the *polis* – a conception that is in significant conflict with many features of our contemporary social context. For on the one hand MacIntyre makes the central claim that we must understand moral philosophy and its progressive development in terms of traditions succeeding one another, and such a moral philosophy should be sensitive to socio-historical and contingent features of human communities; but on the other hand, the tradition he himself favours is that of Aristotelian Thomism, which is not of our time and would seem to have been supplanted through the process of development which he insists upon. In the course of my assessment I will raise doubts whether MacIntyre's own preference for a revival of Thomism as a tradition can be coherent given the significant differ-

ence between our historical situation, i.e., modernity, and that of Aquinas and Aristotle, i.e., the *polis*.

For this difficulty to be resolved, I suggest that MacIntyre can begin his inquiry within the tradition of Aquinas, but in order for him to complete his project and be faithful to his own account of a tradition-guided inquiry, he needs to develop a tradition that incorporates not only elements of Aristotelian and Thomistic thought, but also one that take into account our particular socio-historical context and contemporary philosophical discussions.

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Forest Denis
Gérardin-Laverge Loraine

MacIntyre on the Personal Self, Narratives and the Meaning of "Community"

In *After Virtue,* Alasdair MacIntyre has proposed a narrative theory of personal identity: being a person is being able to give a narrative account of one's actions. Such a theory entails that, as Frankfurt has noted in his critique of Strawson, persons cannot be simply defined as entities to which we can ascribe both physical and mental properties. Concerning mental properties, what matters is not episodic memory, as in the Lockean tradition, but rather the ability to make our past actions intelligible to us and to others by means of a coherent narrative.

One of our aims will be to establish a dialogue between Frankfurt and MacIntyre about personal identity. We would like to examine the following objection to the narrative theory: there are kinds of narrative accounts of one's actions that would not make them fully intelligible; moreover, being able to give reasons for one's actions may not always be a sufficient condition of personhood. In our view, this objection can be met if we make clear that, to be able to give a genuine narrative explanation of his actions, one must be able to form what Frankfurt calls second-order volitions. In addition, we would like to examine the possible role of self-narratives in their relation not only with the past, but with the simulation of one's future. Mental scenarios may be an important component of one's reflection about what one cares about: in the construction of such scenarios, the narrative self meets the volitional self.

Our second aim will be to reflect on the anti-individualistic component of MacIntyre's narrative theory. In *Dependent Rational Animals*, MacIntyre suggests that self-knowledge should be considered as a "shared achievement". A common objection to psychological theories of personal identity is that they do not allow us

to distinguish between *believing to have been X* and *having truly been X*. With his idea of a shared narrative space, where people can give and ask reasons for what they do, as with his emphasis in *After Virtue* on conversation as an "all-pervasive feature of the human world", MacIntyre invites us to reflect on the co-construction of self-narratives, and on the meaning of our mutual dependence.

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Frausto Obed

Disagreements Between the Scientist Gabino Barreda and the Humanist José Maria Vigil: Two Philosophical Traditions in Mexico in the Interior of "Escuela Nacional Preparatoria" in the Second Half of the 19th Century

At the opening of "Escuela Nacional Preparatoria" on February 3rd 1868, the educational system inspired in the philosophy of positivism of the French Auguste Comte was institutionalized by Gabino Barreda who had the opportunity to sit in some classes of Comte at Palais Royale in Paris. Benito Juárez, the president of Mexico, designated Barreda as the first director of the recently established high school. The teaching of positivism in the high school promoted the studies of the sciences instead of philosophy. It incorporated an empirical method in order to understand nature and human behavior. The positivists believed in the superiority of natural sciences over social sciences. Positivism required faith in progress and order in society. Science and technology were taking a more important role. Increasingly, national states promoted technological policies which needed experts and specialization of the scientific professions. Politics was conceived as a type of engineering to more efficiently control human behavior in society. For that reason, human freedom was thought as a geometrical and quantitative unity which always has dependence on the totality. This is to say that political freedom required limits in order to guarantee order and progress in society.

On the other hand, the humanism of José María Vigil is, in general, characterized by the project of the enlightenment and republican humanism, which means secularism, political and social rights, and multicultural equality. He believed in the idea of a wise man that is willing to listen to the arguments of conflicting proposals and exchange points of view. This kind of wise person has to be learned in different subjects such as philosophy, religion, science, arts, literature, politics, history, and ethics. This wise person recognizes the need to exercise practical judgment which cannot be guided by rules. He recognizes that the nature of sets of rules is

that no matter how well formulated they may be, they cannot provide for all such eventualities. This philosophical figure is called *phrônesis* inspired by the Aristotelian tradition. Politics is the best way to have more just laws. Freedom is not individual, nor is it a geometrical unity; rather it is collective, creative, and based on the will and on the common good and the common sense. I will explore the main arguments of both Mexican philosophers to say that these two perspectives are based in two different conceptions of the human being.

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Glezou Aikaterini

Virtue and Practices

MacIntyre's approach to virtue as it unfolds in his book *After Virtue* (p.p. 181-225), is that virtue as "an acquired human quality" cannot exist outside practices as "coherent and complex forms of cooperative human activity". Virtues and practices are interwoven in that without virtues, practices could not achieve goods internal to them and could not also resist the corrupting power of institutions within which they exist. Contemporary philosophers like David Miller, Charles Taylor, Christopher Lutz have criticized MacIntyre's view of practices. In his response to criticism MacIntyre has to accept some sort of relativism as an integral part of human condition stating that rationality is also a practice that only offers the best possible view of the world at a certain time.

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Glycofrydi-Leontsini Athanasia

Virtues and Ethics:
Thomas Aquinas' Reception in Byzantium

Demetrius Cydones (c.1324-c.1397/8), chief minister of the Emperor John VI Cantacuzenus, was an educated layman who dominated the cultural and political life of Byzantium in the 14th century. He had a profound knowledge of the Latin language and the Greek classical heritage and through his translating activity made possible a dynamic dialogue between the Byzantines and the Latins. He was deeply interested in theological issues from a philosophical standpoint and was the first to

translate Thomas Aquinas' major works *Summa contra Gentiles* and *Summa theologiae*. After Cydones' discovery of Thomas Aquinas, who seemed to him to have a better grasp of Plato and Aristotle than did the Greeks themselves, a group of pro-Thomists scholars was composed who were well informed about Western culture through their reading of Latin literature and their traveling to Western Europe mostly for diplomatic and intellectual reasons. Cydones translated Aquinas *ad verbum* with the original text of Aristotle at his side, though occasionally changes in tenses and mood as well as periphrastic language were introduced; in this way has provided us with an accurate and readable Greek text that clarifies Thomas Aquinas' major contribution towards a better understanding of Aristotle's *Ethics* that is well established in his *Summa theologiae*, especially in his *Secunda Secundae* in which Aquinas discusses the three theological virtues, faith, hope and charity and the four cardinal moral virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance with their ramifications and makes a synthesis of Aristotelian 'virtue ethics' with the Christian 'law ethics'.

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Hogan Brendan

Imagination and the Ends of Practical Reason

Dependent Rational Animals sets forth a theory of practical reason that integrates a deep reliance on the capacity of imagination to accomplish the ends of practical reason. Imagination, MacIntyre argues, is the means by which our ends gain plausibility and traction within a particular community. It is also the basis by which alternative conceptions of ends and accounts of one's self can be fashioned and thus is a key element in MacIntyre's version of modern self-consciousness as capable of critique in its stronger sense. This is perhaps surprising in a work responding to the biological metaphysics of his earlier work. MacIntyre's response to these criticisms highlights the continuity of the human species with the rest of the animal kingdom, in terms of their capacities, specifically evidence of proto-rationality. This last move puts MacIntyre in closer company to a tradition not often associated with MacIntyre, and one that has striking affinities with his work, pragmatism. John Dewey's account of practical reason and naturalist account of the capacities of intelligence across species also culminates in putting imagination at the heart of deliberation about means and ends. The models of each of these thinkers converge in the centrality of developing our capacity of imagination as requisite for living the best life possible in terms of practical reasoning. Both theories stand in stark contrast to the rational actor model and both thinkers are hugely critical of the reductivist character of social scientific programs informed by *homo economi-*

cus. Given these convergences, this paper attempts to untangle the relevant differences with respect to human agency and specifically the role of ends in practical reasoning in a modern context. The differences notwithstanding, MacIntyre and Dewey as well as those who use Dewey for their own models of action have far more in common than usually recognized and stand as allies against the scientistic and reductivistic models of the human agent in mainstream social science and modernity more generally.

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Iakovou Vicky

Hannah Arendt's Turn to the Past: A Longing for Tradition or a Benjaminian Gesture?

Hannah Arendt's critique of modernity and her turn to Antiquity –particularly to the Greek *polis*– has been interpreted as a romantic escape out of modern times (L. Ferry, A. Renaut), a kind of "reluctant modernism" (S. Benhabib) or a sign of a will to elaborate a utopian ideal, totally exterior to the values animating modernity (J.-M. Ferry). Her recourse to René Char's aphorism, according to which "our inheritance was left to us by no testament", at the beginning of her essay entitled "The gap between past and future", is often read as expressing a longing for periods when the chain of tradition was still intact. Such interpretations undoubtedly find support in Arendt's work itself, at the cost, however, of passing over in silence several crucial aspects: her critique of the tradition of political thought ("the tradition of political thought […] eliminated many experiences of an earlier past" –*The Human Condition*); her argument that the rediscovery of action and the emergence of a secular public realm is part of the heritage bequeathed by the Modern Age; and her assertion that "the undeniable loss of tradition in the modern world does not at all entail a loss of the past" ("What is authority?).

The main claim of this paper is that Arendt takes a critical stance towards the idea of tradition, something which renders her turn to the past much more complicated than interpretations, such as the aforementioned, are prepared to acknowledge. In order to develop this claim I shall focus on Arendt's essay on Walter Benjamin.

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Knight Kelvin

"If my thesis is correct, Kant was right": Kant's Role within MacIntyre's Critique of the Enlightenment Project

Besides offering the classic definition and ideal of enlightenment, Immanuel Kant is generally recognized as the culmination of "the Enlightenment" as an historical event. Moreover, if his ethics is reduced to that of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, then he indeed seems to present the very antithesis to an Aristotelian, teleological ethics. It would therefore be easy to understand *After Virtue* as anti-Kantian, and this would explain why Alasdair MacIntyre has not joined those who have recently devoted great efforts to synthesize the ethics of Aristotle and Kant. However, MacIntyre has never presented Kant as paradigmatic of the Enlightenment project. This paper seeks to illuminate MacIntyre's understanding of Kant, and to raise the question of how, from a MacIntyrean perspective, contemporary Aristotelians should understand Kant's historical, philosophical and political significance.

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Kompridis Nikolas

Crises of Intelligibility are Also Crises in Human Relationships

Drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre's "Epistemological Crisis, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science" and on some of my own recent work on the concept of receptivity, I outline a view of a epistemological crisis as always at the same time a crisis in human relationships that manifests experiences of injustice. This view is supported by MacIntyre's reading of *Hamlet*, and my reading of J.M. Coetzee's *Elizabeth Costello.*

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Korkut-Raptis Buket

Aristotle on Happiness and Virtuous Activities

One of the difficult topics in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is the nature of the relationship between happiness and virtuous activities (i.e. theoretically virtuous activity of philosophy and morally virtuous activities). In philosophical literature there are two competing views. According to one view, happiness consists exclusively in philosophical activity. This is known as the monist (or intellectualist) account of happiness. The other view holds that happiness also involves morally virtuous activities. This is called the inclusivist account of happiness. Both views have their own merits and shortcomings. In this article, I will try to suggest a comprehensive interpretation that can resolve the debate.

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Koutougkos Aris

Desires and Rationality:
Pushing Analytic Philosophy to Its Limits

Desires stand any way in the verge of rationality and irrationality so I am tempted to begin with Kavafi's 'realism' concerning unfulfilled desires …

> *Σαν σώματα ωραία νεκρών <u>που δεν εγέρασαν</u>*
> *και τα 'κλεισαν, με δάκρυα, σε μαυσωλείο λαμπρό,*
> *με ρόδα στο κεφάλι και στα πόδια γιασεμιά –*
> *έτσ' η επιθυμίες μοιάζουν που επέρασαν*
> *χωρίς να εκπληρωθούν· χωρίς ν' αξιωθεί καμιά*
> *της ηδονής μια νύχτα, ή ένα πρωί της φεγγερό.*
>
> <div align="right">Κ. Π. Καβάφης</div>

> [As dead in full grace that <u>never grew old</u>,
> put in grand mausoleum with mourning, and tears,
> and roses, around the head and jasmine by the feet –
> desires are like that passed away
> not being fulfilled; not a single one granted
> *της ηδονής* a night, or glowing morning.]

…This is an extreme interpretation concerning the existence of unfulfilled desires, extreme in favor of a realism of desires, not in some vague pragmatic and/or phe-

nomenological sense, but as distinct existences (to borrow the Humean term) necessary to allow meaningful discussions of morality in general, and of *akrasia* in particular – of the possibility, that is, for an agent to act in full awareness against own judgment – the expression 'meaningful discussions', indirectly of course, refers to my prejudice to consider as not particularly meaningful those discussions that lightheartedly deal with the threats of reducing morality (via dubious 'explanations') to rationality, to start with, and subsequently to other fields, biology, physics, psychology, etc.

I will argue therefore in what follows about the necessity of desires in venturing for answers to leading meta-ethical questions (about akrasia, for example), provided we care for the autonomy of morality, and (why not), surprisingly enough, also for the *meaningfulness of rationality* as such!

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Leontsini Eleni

Alasdair MacIntyre's Aristotelian Account
of Civic Friendship

In this paper, I would like to explore the communitarian notion of friendship and to examine whether this really agrees with Aristotle's analysis of friendship as presented in the *Nicomachean*, the *Eudemian Ethics* and in the *Rhetoric*. It should be pointed out that, although communitarians do discuss friendship in various places of their work, their discussions, nevertheless, do not focus on the normative notion of friendship as such, but, instead, merely mention its importance in relation to the community and the family. Also, it should be noted that no systematic discussion of the communitarian notion of friendship has so far been produced. As I will try to demonstrate in this paper, communitarian accounts of friendship seem to fall victim of the Aristotelian criticisms of Plato's *Republic* on the unity of state.

More specifically, in this paper I will focus on Alasdair MacIntyre's account being the most characteristic and the most Aristotelian. MacIntyre sustains what he claims to be an Aristotelian conception of friendship. Friendship is for him a network of relationships that unifies a political community in virtue of a "shared conception of the good" and a "common project of creating and sustaining the life of the *polis*". MacIntyre's contrast is between a modern and an ancient conception of friendship; he decries the weakness that he attributes to what he calls 'modern' friendship derived from its consignment to 'private life', in contrast to the 'social and political' friendship of the ancients. He also maligns the basis of modern friendship in emotion and affection and regards it as, at best, "that inferior form of

friendship which is founded on mutual advantage" (*AV*: 146-147). According to MacIntyre, it is only via the virtues of the right sort of friendship that we will be able to cement the political bonds of the community.

Indeed, MacIntyre's reading of Aristotle's notion of friendship seems to be controversial and quite different from the account of Aristotelian friendship, or from any standard treatment of Aristotelian friendship for that matter. MacIntyre is right to acknowledge that a community whose shared aim is the realization of the human good presupposes a wide range of agreement in that community on goods and virtues; it is this agreement that makes possible the kind of bond between citizens which constitutes a polis. That bond is the bond of friendship, as MacIntyre says, and "the type of friendship which Aristotle has in mind is that which embodies a shared recognition of and pursuit of a good"; "it is this sharing which is essential and primary to the constitution of any form of community, whether that of a household or that of a city" (*AV*: 155). MacIntyre seems to think that in order to reconcile Aristotle's notion of political friendship (taking into account the size of the population of a *polis*) with Aristotle's assertion that one cannot have many friends one must say that "we are to think of friendship as being the sharing of all in the common project of creating and sustaining the life of the city, a sharing incorporated in the immediacy of an individual's particular friendships" (*AV*: 156). Friendship is a bond between the citizens by being composed of a network of small groups of friends.

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Lutz Christopher

Freedom and Practical Reasoning in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre: The Virtue of Obedience and the Virtues of the Good Life

In Chapter 16 of After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre compares the Aristotelian concept of virtues as habits that support sound and effective practical reasoning to the modern concept of virtue as a as a habit that supports obedience to moral rules. MacIntyre defends the Aristotelian notion of virtues and criticizes the modern concept of virtue. This comparison parallels a discussion in the history of Christian Ethics that contrasts two conflicting understandings of freedom. In a landmark work published in 1985, *Les sources de la morale chrétienne*, Servais Pinckaers distinguishes the classical notion of freedom, which he calls "freedom for excellence," from "freedom of indifference," the notion of freedom that has dominated Western thought—both Christian and secular—since the 14th century. In

2000, Alasdair MacIntyre praised Pinckaers's book as a study that reframed the major controversies of late twentieth century Christian ethics.

This paper will examine Pinckaers's two definitions of freedom and consider evidence supporting his distinction with evidence from classical and modern sources; then it will consider MacIntyre's comparison of Aristotelian virtues and modern virtue in the light of Pinckaers's distinction. The contrast between "freedom of indifference" and "freedom for excellence" illuminates MacIntyre's ethics and underscores the differences between MacIntyre's moral philosophy and the claims of modern and post-modern theorists. MacIntyre's philosophy proposes a recovery of the virtues of practical reasoning in pursuit of common goods, while rival schools of thought remain entangled in questions concerning legitimate authority to demand obedience to arbitrary commands.

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Maggini Golfo

MacIntyre's Nietzschean Anti-modernism

In his paper on "Nietzsche or Aristotle? Reflections on Alasdair MacIntyre's *After virtue*", Richard J. Bernstein argues that the critique of the modern Enlightenment project to which MacIntyre proceeds in his *After Virtue* resembles more than it should Nietzsche's genealogical unmasking of modern morality and value. He, thus, reaches the conclusion that MacIntyre's polemical arguments against modernity turns him more into Nietzsche's companion more than his main enemy. In our paper, we will delve into Bernstein's claims in favour of MacIntyre's Nietzschean anti-modernism. Then, we will ask whether this criticism still stands for MacIntyre's treatment of Nietzschean genealogy in *Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry* (1990) and in his more recent writings.

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Makris Spiros

The Concept of Tradition in Hannah Arendt's Thought and the Modern Loss of Authority

The *Tradition* constitutes one of the key-concepts in Hannah Arendt's thought. In the whole of the Arendtian corpus the meaning of Tradition is synonym to the *crisis of modernity*. Especially, the modern *loss* of the Tradition is closely linked with

the question of *authority*. Therefore, the core meaning of Tradition in Hannah Arendt's thought is derived through the tradition of Western political philosophy. No doubt Socrates' death haunts this great Tradition. From Plato to Marx, Hannah Arendt points out, takes place a deep transformation of the *classical republicanism*. Man is no more an acting human being in a public realm but a vassal to a transcendental absolute. The Greek political experience of *polis* and the Roman experience of f*oundation* lost their initial meaning, distorting the understanding of political action between equals, or the sacred significance of the foundation of the city, bringing to the fore of Western political philosophy the unsolvable enigma of *violence*. *Persuasion* and *authority* gave way to c*oercion*, *violence* and *command/obedience* relationship. To put the matter differently, modernity's crisis is the modern loss of Tradition as authority. The decay of Tradition and authority, Arendt concludes, paved the way to the rise of *mass-based political ideologies* and to the twentieth century's *Totalitarianism*. In this paper, we shall try to highlight Hannah Arendt's basic lines of thought concerning Tradition and authority in order to show how the modern meaning of power gradually identified with the brute force of Nazism. Enzo Traverso's work, for instance, is a direct result of this Arendtian perspective.

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Malakos Tolis

<h1 align="center">What Moves the Intellect?
Two Different Traditions of Practical Rationality:
Aristotelian and Stoic Prohairesis and Augustinian Voluntas</h1>

In modern moral theory the concept of the will takes central stage in accounts of practical rationality starting with Kant's claim that since a good will is the only thing that is unconditionally good, practical reason has as its end nothing other but a good will. But reasoning according to Kant presupposes the autonomy of the will. When reasoning about action I do not dwell on my interests and desires, subjecting myself to the causality of nature, but I motivate myself on the basis of reason alone. This ability to motivate myself is called by Kant the autonomy of the will. The notion of the autonomy of the will, even when willing is not equated with reasoning as in Kant, but with a voluntaristic leap based on faith as in Kierkegaard, or a radical, groundless will to will as in Nietzsche, seems to imply that practical rationality is incapable of motivating the moral agent by itself or at all and motivation comes from a distinct faculty of the mind which has the function of moving the agent to act.

In some respects this modern notion of the will builds upon the Augustinian conception of the will and what Henry Frankfurt has called a second order volition, namely a will to will something, an ability of the will to command and direct itself as well as paradoxically to resist its own commands. As A. McIntyre claims in Whose Justice? Which Rationality, "For Augustine intellect itself needs to be moved to activity by will. It is will which guides attention in one direction rather than the other" (p.156). Augustine seems to claim that the root cause of any action which provides the limit to any inquiry on the causal chain of action is the will itself, i.e. willing is a sui generis, spontaneous capacity which causes itself and functions as an ultimate arbitrator between possible courses of action. In other words, the supposition is that acts of will have no efficient cause other that the will itself, and that reasoning on an action is not leading to action unless will consents to it. But to the question 'Whence the will?' or 'Do we really have such a thing as a will?' Augustine does not provide satisfactory answers. It seems therefore that the will is a fantom, an unmoved mover, which motivates the agent by itself, introducing a ghost which haunts practical reasoning.

According to Albrecht Dihle's The Theory of the Will in Classical Antiquity, there was no conception of will in ancient philosophy, and many commentators concur that there is no conception of will in Aristotle's ethics where motivation, moving to action, was conceived as being provided by a combination of emotional desires and reasoning, corresponding to the two different parts of the soul which was conceived as moving itself. Willing was considered a part of desiring and reasoning in the sense of *Prohairesis* or deciding based on such a combination, and not in its own right.

This paper will provide a critical reading of Aristotle's and Epictetus' conception of *Prohairesis* and the Augustinian conception of *Voluntas* and relate these readings to the discussion of the two traditions in Whose Justice? Which Rationality. Substantively, it will try to address the question "Is there a will?".

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Maletta Sante

Politics and Religion in the Post-Secular Society

The major aim of this paper is to answer the following question: How can Christianity contribute to the common good? I will take the perspective of contemporary social philosophy.

After defining the meaning of 'post-secular society' from a sociological viewpoint, I will focus on the possibility of a 'political theology' (in the sense of Carl Schmitt) nowadays. In Italy this question was recently discussed with effect from the cele-

brations of the 1700th anniversary of the Edict of Milan (313 a.D.). In this occasion some scholars defended a perspective which can be defined as 'neo-Augustinian'. I will present and discuss Joseph Ratzinger's version of this perspective—which rejects Schmitt's political theology in favor of a *political ethos*—in the light of the so-called Dilemma of Böckenförde ('The free secular state lives according to presuppositions that it cannot itself guarantee'). According to Ratzinger, Augustine's doctrine of the 'two cities' (the divine and the human) is still helpful as on one side it avoids any sacralization of social and political entities, while on the other side it recognizes their own autonomy and value. To preserve this healthy dualism it is necessary for the 'divine city' to be present in the public realm not only through its single members but also as a community with its own juridical institutions. From a MacIntyrian viewpoint I will argue that a liberal state is required to take up the challenge of the 'divine city' if it wants to defend its own liberal nature.

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Mardosas Egidijus

Human Flourishing and Economic Democracy

What is the importance of economic activity for human flourishing understood in MacIntyrean terms? Alasdair MacIntyre wrote mostly about the type of social and political structures that are essential to human flourishing. He nevertheless has made several remarks about the economic structures: for example, he mentioned embedded market relationships (in *Dependent Rational Animals*) and that his ethics should be compatible with some truth of Marxism (in particular the truths concerning the nature of capitalism, the role of work under capitalism and the movement of capital are mentioned in the essay *Where We Were, Where We Are, Where We Need to Be*) and some other remarks.

I argue that the question of economic structures should be one of the central concerns when trying to account for the flourishing political community and individuals. Thus the Marxist critique of capitalist economic relations cannot be discarded. Commenting on MacIntyre's remarks of economic structures I will also focus on Aristotle's discussion about the relation between the political and the economical. Aristotle stressed the primacy of the political – the activity of 'wealth acquisition' must be subjected to politics as the 'master science' of the human good and not to be separated and left to be pursued for its own sake. I will suggest that we need to draw on the tradition of democratic socialism that is the tradition of economic democracy, which could provide valuable insight to the discussion about the role of economics for human flourishing. Modern participatory political community must encompass democratic economic relations.

McCall Brian Michael

Finding an Ontology for Law and Legal Authority
in the Natural Law Tradition

Modern Legal Theories are at a loss to produce an ontology of law and legal authority. Law is either a mere power play (Hart's gunman) or a social convention. Attempts to ground law and legal authority in consent and utilitarian theories have failed. As a result modernity, and the last century in particular, has witnessed a rise of the authoritarian. The Natural law tradition rooted in Aristotelian realism as developed by Thomism offers not only an ontologically sound foundation for law and authority but also offers an ontologically based limitation on the exercise of legal authority. This Aristotelian/Thomist Tradition places human law within a cosmic architecture that grounds human law as well as limits its abuse. The paper based on research on an ongoing book length project will present an overview of this architecture of law and the ways in which the architecture supports and constrains legal authority. One particular difficulty for this Tradition in a modern secular age and a source of incommensurable dialogue with secularism is the necessity for the eternal law and hence the divine foundation of the architecture. Yet, using MacIntyre's "epistemological crisis" the Natural Law tradition can demonstrate to the Liberal Secularist tradition that it better answers the questions what is law and what restrains the abuse of legal authority than does the Liberal Secularist tradition.

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McMylor Peter

Going Normative in Search of an Ethical
and Radical Social Science:
A MacIntyrean Exploration of the Moral Social Science
of Andrew Sayer

For some time now the sociologist Andrew Sayer has been calling for a normative turn in contemporary social science (A. Sayer 2005, 2011). He rightly points out that much contemporary social science finds it hard to deal with the ethical dimensions of everyday life and tends to dissolve such issues into apparently subjective conceptions of 'values' that can seem to be 'irrationally' applied by social ac-

tors to their social contexts and frequently to be explained in instrumental terms as merely expressions of social structural locations or on conventionalist grounds which tends to reduce morality to norms of particular social groups. Interestingly, however, in attempting to grasp the significance of evaluation in social activity and to bring it back within the sphere of reason, Sayer has focussed on our human capacity for flourishing or experiencing harm and this has led him to reach out to elements of a broadly understood Aristotelianism. This paper will explore what a MacIntyrean approach can gain from this work and also suggest areas where Sayer's work might itself be amended and augmented in the light of MacIntyre's arguments.

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Mela Lia

Modernity, Postmodernity and Beyond

MacIntyre's critique, focused on the problems of contemporary societies, ends up as a broader critique of the Enlightenment Project. According to MacIntyre, this project is best outlined in Encyclopaedia. He believes that the failure of the Enlightenment Project, understood as the inability to replace tradition by a scientific, grounded on reason, conception of the world and human society, leads to the emergence of Genealogy. MacIntyre's historical project aims, through the rediscovery of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of virtues, to overcome the crisis of modernity.

The main thesis of this paper is that MacIntyre's theory is itself inconceivable except within the framework of modern, not ancient or medieval, western societies. His critique is best understood as criticism of Logical Positivism, as much as it is perceived as the peak of the Enlightenment Project. Its collapse leads to relativistic theories connected with Postmodernism, which largely follows Nietzschean criticism. In that light, and in order to overcome the crisis of modern society, a more moderate request for depart from the impasse, formed by both Logical Positivism and Postmodernism, may be acceptable. However, this does not imply renunciation of Modernity, but rather the discovery within the Enlightenment of those elements that can help to overcome the crisis.

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Moutsopoulos, Evangelos

Avant-garde and Postmodernism:
A Moral-Aesthetic Dialectic

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Murdoch Jr James Murray

Ideology in the Early MacIntyre

MacIntyre's discussion of tradition and tradition-based enquiry has received a great deal of attention in the literature and is one of the central points of his mature philosophical studies. Mark C. Murphy, in his 2003 edited volume of essays, offers a provocative suggestion, namely, that ideology in the earlier work is a precursor to the mature concept of tradition. Ideology, he notes, is not purely pejorative for the early MacIntyre, but rather functions in certain positive and even necessary ways for the determination of human purposes. This raises the question of what specifically the relation might be between ideology in MacIntyre's early texts and the more mature discussions of tradition and of human nature in *After Virture* and beyond. In this paper, I will examine the discussion of ideology in MacIntyre's early work, with a particular focus on Murphy's suggestion. Through the lens of certain early works, particularly "Notes from the Moral Wilderness I and II," and the 1971 text, *Against the Self Images of the Age*, I will argue that ideology in its positive sense points to the necessity for articulating a certain view of the good, much like the later discussion of tradition will do.

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Nicholas L. Jeffery

Disclosure, Tradition, and Substantive Reason:
Changing Paradigms in Frankfurt School
Critical Theory

In *Critique and Disclosure*, Nikolas Kompridis argues that critical theory needs a paradigm shift, one that includes his notion of disclosure and intimate critique. Disclosure seeks after, not simply truth, but disclosure of possibility for the future

in contrast to the present. In *Reason, Tradition, and the Good*, I too argue that critical theory needs a paradigm change, one that comes from taking tradition seriously and focuses on substantive reason in contrast to Habermas' communicative rationality. The question that arises is, does anything unite disclosure with substantive reason, intimate critique with tradition. In this paper, I argue that disclosure, by itself, is not enough and that it must be tied to a conception of tradition and substantive reason. I will utilize Mac Horkheimer's discussion of subjective rationality and objective reason to demonstrate that disclosure needs tradition and substantive reason because critical theory—intimate critique of human ends—requires a substantive construal of the good and, in turn, a conception of human nature.

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O'Neill   Michael

Philosophical History as First Philosophy: An Examination of MacIntyre's Use of Historical Arguments

MacIntyre's arguments in several of his texts relies heavily on a kind of argumentation that is historical. We see this in *After* Virtue¸ *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry,* and *God, Philosophy, Universities* to give a few examples. At the same time, this form of historical argumentation is put to uses that are not traditionally the province of history, but instead of philosophy. In *After Virtue*, for instance, the conclusion of his historical analysis results in the diagnosis of the incommensurability of the first principles of thought within liberalism. This conclusion would seem to be the province of metaphysics (first philosophy as Aristotle might have called it), not of history.

If this kind of argumentation is simply a kind of historical analysis, it is then liable to the same kinds of critique to which any historical analyses are vulnerable – questions of evidence, of historical cause, of historical law, of subjective bias, of misinterpretation, etc. And, MacIntyre's arguments would have to stand or fall on their ability to address these criticisms and concerns.

If the kind of history that MacIntyre is practicing is something else – a philosophical history – than it remains to us to understand what this might be and then to see whether this kind of history must be evaluated differently, with a different set of standards and critiques, than history proper. I will argue that the history that MacIntyre practices is in fact a kind of metaphysics.

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Pangalos Michael

Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor
on Fragmented Self, Good and Hypergood

In his seminal *After Virtue,* Alasdair MacIntyre connects virtues and practices and then examines the necessity for the life of virtue to be centered on one good. If the moral agent fails to see his life as a whole, unified at least by one "substantive" good, then moral life is pervaded "By too many conflicts and too much arbitrariness" (*After Virtue,* p. 201). For if the life of virtue is continuously fragmented by incompatibles choices, then "it may seem that the goods internal to practices do after all derive their authority from our individual choice" and then "the modern self with its criterion less choices […] reappears" (*After Virtue,* p. 202), in an apparently Aristotelian context, that of rational choice and decision. This single good permeates the multiplicity of goods which inform practices and "goes beyond" them to create the hierarchy of goods (or "values") which is necessary to moral action. MacIntyre speaks of an "overriding good" which "warranted putting other goods in a subordinate place" or a "telos" which "transcends the limited goods of practices by *constituting* the good of a whole human life" (*After Virtue,* p. 202, I underline, MP). It is for the sake of this imperative unity and constancy of virtue life, contrary to the fragmentation of the modern self, that MacIntyre will explore the importance of the concept of a tradition, in the rest of *After Virtue* and in his next major books. Furthermore, since the fragmentation of the self is a consequence of the modern life, MacIntyre will adopt a critic attitude to modernity.

In his great book *Sources of the Self,* Charles Taylor also examines the same problem: what is the presupposition for a moral agent in order to exist as an integral and consistent –and not as a "punctual" Lockean self– Taylor sustains that self cannot exist but in a moral space of strong evaluations, in an essential framework of questions (*Sources of the Self*, first part, p. 3-91: 49). Up to this point then, the two contemporary thinkers seem to be close to each other.

I believe, nevertheless, that there is a "disagreement in this agreement", which is not centered so much on the concept of the tradition, as on the very concept of "fragmentation" and of the "fragmented self", perceived by the two thinkers in a different way, since Taylor has also a positive reading of "fragmented self" which, in my opinion, derives from his broader reading of modernity and secularization. In my paper I will try to explore further this "disagreement in the agreement" on good and "fragmented self", between MacIntyre and Taylor.

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Papageorgakis George

F.A. Von Hayek:
Basic Aspects and Concepts of his Thought
Regarding to the Doctrine of Neoliberalism

F.A. von Hayek was one of the leading thinkers of the 20th century. Hayek, along with Milton Friedman, has set the principles where the neoliberal doctrine was founded on. He was a supporter of the free market economy and an opponent of government intervention in the economy. A rival of centralized economic planning in particular and an adversary of economic intervention in general. For Hayek, central planned economy is a very serious threat to individual freedom, because the government intervention would affect the human activities, leading inevitably to forms of totalitarianism and tyranny. The gnosiology and anthropology of Hayek and concepts such as "spontaneous order", "individualism" and "freedom" were the main pillars of his thought on the basis of which he built the neoliberal theory as an attempt to defend classical liberalism. The political and economic theory of neoliberalism is based on philosophical terms and concepts. The intention of this paper is to provide an overview on the basic concepts of Hayekian thought which are the necessary conditions of economic neoliberalism. In other words, in this study we will not deal with the pursuits and proposals of neoliberalism, but we will examine neoliberalism in regard to its premises and mainly regarding to its preconditions that are not "economic", nonetheless underpinning the neoliberal worldview, namely social, political, institutional and anthropological factors. Understanding and interpreting a worldview or a stream of thinking is not enough to know what it is, how it is defined and where it is aimed at, but one must know, apart from these, the basic facts that solidifies the theory (and are necessary for the theory to exist) and also must recognize the evolutionary process of this theory in spacetime. Therefore, we believe that the study of the preconditions of neoliberalism is crucial in order to interpretate spherical the neoliberal theory.

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Papalexiou Kerasenia

Le Flâneur – The Issue of Wanderer

The approach of wanderer from Socrates era up to G. Simmel, E. A. Poe, Baudelaire, Benjamin, who wanders with his own particular style in a city, presents interesting dialectic elements (proximity-distance, interaction) and central items for

a philosophical anthropologic regard. Is he a dynamic intellectual (Socrates), outside the shackles of the status (quo), which he deconstructs the determined and expected, or is he an outsider of the social microcosm in which wandered, a wanderer which, however, does not recommend real threat. In both cases we can distinguish certain common characteristics: strange and outlandish profile, sharp eye, detachment, emancipation, tendency of autonomy.

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Peik Herfeh Shirzad

The Moral Permissibility of "Subjective Harms": A Neglected Principle in Conceptions of Liberty

We are free in so far as our freedom "is consistent with every other person's freedom," or "so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it." In other words, "each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all."

Theses famous principles by well-known moral and political philosophers like Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and John Rawls seem clear and reasonable *prima facie*. However, these principles, especially terms like "in so far as," "so long as," "consistent with" and "compatible with" in them, are so ambiguous, vague, and broad that even fanatic persons and tyrannies can misuse them to justify their brutal violent actions.

This article tries to show that to clarify these principles and terms and to establish a free tolerant society and reasonable conceptions of liberty, we need a morally relevant epistemological distinction on harms. I call it the objective/subjective distinction. To harm somebody, that is to act against her interests, *per se* cannot be morally impermissible. This is because there are harmful actions that can still be "compatible with the scheme of basic liberties for all," and "are consistent with every other person's freedom." I call these harms "subjective," and I think giving the agent the right to do them is a pre-condition of any free tolerant society.

I propose two criteria to recognize a harm as subjective: 1. the person will not be harmed if she changes some of her personal beliefs or, at least, will give the agent the right to do the action; or 2. we can imagine some people exactly in the same situation who are not harmed by the same action or, at least, give the agent the right to do it. For example, wearing clothes that harm some person(s), delivering a lecture which some person(s) may find annoying, or speaking about an idea

which some person(s) may find disgusting or repugnant, are all good examples of subjective harms.

Proposing, describing, and analyzing this distinction and defending the moral permissibility of subjective harms, this article tries to clarify those famous ambiguous moral principles and terms to prevent any misuse of them.

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Pevec Rozman Mateja

Modernity, Crisis and Perspectives:
The Role of Tradition in Contemporary Culture

The modern western civilisation is trapped in radical crisis; we are facing with global crisis which is not only economic, political or financial but also spiritual (moral crisis). Unemployment is increasing and social distresses are growing up. A human of contemporaneity is floating on the clouds of uncertainty, fears, doubts and distrust. People are more and more frightened and vulnerable, vulnerable are human relationships as well. The moment of today's Europe is essentially changed also in another way: after the fall of Berlin Wall and foundation of European Union the Europe is becoming more and more multicultural. The immigration of foreigners and the free movement of labour make the European Union becoming increasingly non-monolithic, "inter-religious" even. All of this raises new challenges for Europe and the World, among which the following two can be perceived as the most challenging ones, namely, the meeting of various cultures and religions as well as establishing the dialogue as a basis for harmonic co-existence among the diversified and different. This article examines the role of religions in today's situation or precisely: what is the role of tradition? Traditions are bearers of systems of values and standards of excellences. With MacIntyre I shall argue that tradition is not petrified and paralysed but dynamic composition that must constantly be liable for rational inquiring and critical evaluation. Contemporary time is denoted by different traditions that supplements and enrich each other but sometimes also contradicts. Maximal theological openness and willingness for dialog are necessary for harmonically coexistence of different traditions. In this article I shall also try to find a common foundation, which is actually a necessary condition for dialog: with MacIntyre I see this common foundation in "revitalisation" of virtue ethics and in acceptance of virtues that are also necessary for harmonious and flourishing common future of mankind.

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Pournari Maria

On MacIntyre's Humean Distinction
Between 'Is' and 'Ought'

Over the past decades, most discussion of Hume's moral theory has focused on what it has been called the "motivational argument", and the ontological status of moral properties. But it is instructive to recall that in 1950s and 1960s, center stage was given to his short passage on whether an "ought" can be derived from an "is" (Treatise, 469-70); that is, whether any claim about what one is morally obliged to do can be inferred from statements of fact alone. Hume was commonly interpreted as denying that any deductive inference was valid, and this thesis was elevated to the status of "Hume's law". However, this interpretation was not unanimous, and a lively controversy developed regarding Hume's intentions. Should we read him as meaning that the derivation of an "ought" from an "is" really is impossible, or take him literally as saying merely that it just seems impossible, before showing how it can be done?

According to MacIntyre ("Hume on 'is' and 'ought'", 1955), the standard interpretation of this passage takes Hume to be asserted that no set of non-moral premises can entail a moral conclusion, claiming the autonomy of morality thesis. MacIntyre wants to show that this interpretation is inadequate and misleading. In fact, Hume's remarks occur at the end of a chapter devoted to a sustained critique of moral rationalism, where the passage itself ends with an explicit reference to such theories, and his view that "The distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason". (T, 470) On the controversy related to the interpretation of "deduction" MacIntyre points out that the eighteenth-century usage of this term was wider than our own, including not just what Hume would call demonstrative inference but also induction. First, he argues that the immense respect accorded to Hume thus interpreted is puzzling, since it is radically inconsistent with the disapproval with which contemporary logicians are apt to view certain of Hume's arguments about induction. Second, he shows that if this interpretation is correct, then "the first breach of Hume's law was committed by Hume's own moral theory does not square with what he is taken to assert about 'is' and 'ought'. The aim of this paper is to outline the MacIntyre's argument and to clarify the necessary Humean distinctions of Hume's argument against moral rationalism.

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Procopiou Eleni

Person and the Tradition of *Common Good* in the Theory of Justice of Thomas Aquinas

The Christian anthropology of Thomas Aquinas, a product of the reconciliation of theology with philosophy, of faith with reason, offers a new concept of the world and man. Man, apart from being human and thus part of human nature, that is, humanity is also an individual existence, a person within an experienced history. The theological elaboration of the notion of a person in the thought of Thomas Aquinas is combined with the acknowledgement of the "nature" of things and the ontological revaluation of the material world, resulting in the acknowledgement of the partially autonomous existence of man as natural individual, and the perception of the metaphysical (philosophical) notion of a person, which has undoubtedly a worldwide significance for modern thought.

The practical and social character of a person is expressed in the moral teachings of Aquinas, above all in the field of relations in the context of law.

Man, as a natural person, is subjected to "relations of justice" concerning, above all, social life in whose context a person is an outcome of natural legitimacy and defined by his relations. A person here has two aspects: one concerning the "general" justice, that is, justice as social ethics in accordance with a person's social existence; and another relating to "partial justice", that is, justice aiming at jus; justice as a legal state of things and relations. The latter concerns man as a subject of relations in the context of law regarding things, through which the legal existence of a human being as a person is constructed; that is, he acquires legal qualities and "roles". This is the legal framework within which persons relate directly with goods and, through them, with each other.

Thus, the supernatural destination of a person as human being is complemented by the practical, social character of a person, as expressed in the field of legal relations and law. Consequently, the notion of a person in its spiritual and social-legal context becomes a precursor of the modern era and a forerunner of human rights; however, it remains part of the tradition of common good as expressed in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. We may say that Aquinas' moderate "personalism" balances impersonal ancient metaphysics and individualism of modern times.

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Psarros Nikolaos

Time and Freedom

Personal beings are characterized by the fact that they are subject to both physical (e.g. growth, metabolism) and mental changes (e.g. trains of thought, perfective changes in their epistemic states). Regarding the temporal structure of both physical and mental changes, there is seemingly no possibility of altering the temporal order of the phases of either a physical or a mental change, nor is it possible to interrupt their continuity. Thus the existence of personal beings appears to be totally determined by the temporal structure of both their physical and mental changes.

On the other hand, personal beings experience their existence in the mode of freedom, for freedom makes up the content of the thoughts that mark the final cause of any mental change. Additionally the concept of freedom appears to be intertwined with the nature of personal beings in such a manner that it is impossible to reduce freedom to a more primitive concept.

Such a fundamental understanding of the freedom of personal beings seems to be in contradiction to the total determination of the physical and mental changes that make up the existence of personal beings. This contradiction cannot be resolved by a compatibilist account, but by a reformulation of the problem of the relationship between freedom and temporality: Instead of examining how freedom is possible under the condition of temporality, one should ask if and how temporality is necessary for the manifestation of freedom.

The necessity of temporality for the manifestation of freedom is given by the fact that personal beings are conscious not only of the fact of their sheer existence, but also of the fact that their existence is a realisation of a *form*, namely of the form of a personal being. This fact is described by saying that personal beings are *self-conscious*. This means that personal beings seek actively and intentionally for the realisation of their form and in doing so they choose the "best way" for achieving this end without being subject to any external coercion. Thus the self-conscious, intentional realisation of the form of a personal being is the manifestation of its *freedom of will*. And since the realization of a form is a temporal process the manifestation of the freedom of will of personal beings is by its nature, i.e. by necessity, temporal. Additionally, personal beings are able to establish their own aims by creating new forms and realizing them by means of their actions. Thus the freedom of will is completed by the *freedom of creation*, or in Kantian terms by the *spontaneity* of personal beings, which is in the same sense and because of the same reasons necessarily of temporal nature.

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Rauschenbach Michael

MacIntyrean Theology, Competing Traditions, and Divine Commands

Despite the development of Alasdair MacIntyre's publicly stated views in moral philosophy over the course of his career, his understanding of the relationship that must obtain between our knowledge of God and independent standards of rational justification changed little from his earliest writings on the subject as an atheist to his later examinations of various theological issues as a Catholic. This is a strange and somewhat surprising result, one that has substantial relevance both theologically, and for those who are strictly interested in MacIntyrean critiques of various competing traditions, and in his account of rational justification and its relation to truth, issues that are in no way unique to his thought.

My argument proceeds through several stages. First, I want to make explicit what I take to be MacIntyre's thoughts about the relationship between rational justification and truth as expressed in his major works. I argue that, despite his stridently anti-relativist inclinations, his position can be only insufficiently distinguished from those he criticizes. Hearing several variations on one theme should make my criticisms of his position's coherence more salient—in every case, he lacks an account of how rationally justified traditions get hooked up with true moral claims. Secondly, I want to locate this tension in his treatment of a complex web of theological beliefs regarding divine commands and religious faith common to both Catholicism and to the work of Soren Kierkegaard. Examining his condemnation of Kierkegaard in *After Virtue*, which abates only slightly upon reconsideration of the central disputes in *Kierkegaard After MacIntyre*, illuminates this tension's centrality to his thought about rational justification in both the moral and theological arenas. MacIntyre thinks it irrational to obey divine commands for which no justification, prospectively, can be given. I argue that divine commands can only be justified retrospectively, but that the failure of MacIntyre's account demonstrates precisely why obeying them is nonetheless rational.

MacIntyre may be able to deflect some of my criticisms on pragmatic grounds, and I consider some ways he might do so. Nevertheless, I do not think a satisfying fix that remains compatible with MacIntyre's overall theory is available, and I conclude that, at least on some important moral and theological questions, one will have to forego providing any sort of rational justification to those external to one's tradition. This requires, however, not an abandonment of the project of making truth claims, but a reassertion of its importance.

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Reese Matthew

The Problem with Modern Ethics

Virtue Ethicists who follow the arguments set out in Elizabeth Anscombe's *Modern Moral Philosophy* have consistently referenced problems with Modern Ethical thought. Discovering 'the problem' with Modern Ethics has been elusive, but is important for two reasons: first, it is, itself, historically interesting were there to emerge a common thread running through all of modernity; second, the answer unifies the domain of Virtue Ethics. That is, coming to agree on 'what went wrong with Modern Ethics' determines whether and how philosophers should think about Virtue Ethics.

The aim of my paper is to argue that there is a single underlying problem for modern ethical thought by evaluating three influential dichotomies. I situate historical claims made by Alasdair MacIntyre (1982) and Iris Murdoch (1970) into a broader framework. MacIntyre argues that each Hume, and Kant and Reid incorrectly reduce the content of ethical thought to an impersonal moral value. Iris Murdoch, however, argues the problem with modern ethical thought is that it either concerns only overt actions, the behaviorist tradition, or internal movements of the will, the existentialist tradition, which she thinks is a false dichotomy. There is, still, a further worry that permeates modernity. I argue that the problem with Modern Ethics is properly displayed between Humean Empiricists and Moorean Intuitionists. Each neglect that apprehending morality might require subjectivity, that is, a method of understanding, which includes the world as it appears through the senses. This includes the primary senses: optical, auditory, tactile, gustatory, and olfactory, as well as whatever else is particular to a person that might alter her unique perception including beliefs, physical composition and history. Therefore, I argue that the problem of Modern Ethics is best framed as one about *methodology*. Grounding morality in subjectivity serves two purposes: (1) it is necessary for a complete account of ethics; (2) it establishes a proper unifying theme for rising Virtue Ethicists.

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Robson   Angus

Constancy

Many would consider accounts of careers in banking to be a strange context for an exploration of the virtue of constancy. However, if MacIntyre is right that the virtues are necessary in order to resist the corrupting power of institutions, then the

conflicts which have arisen due to the acquisitiveness of some global banks might in fact be a fruitful place to look for virtues of resistance. This paper aims to explore constancy in the context of Scottish banking over the last thirty years, and to show how any adequate understanding of this virtue is dependent on an understanding of the underlying structures of virtue ethics.

The empirical evidence used in this paper was generated through research conversations with ten leaders of Scottish banking, who talked in depth about their own career histories and their perception of changes in the banking sector since the 1970s. Narratives of conflict occur throughout these conversations, and this has given occasion for accounts of resistance and of constancy. The question then arises as to how acts of resistance may be interpreted as exhibiting the virtue of constancy, rather than some related disposition of character, such as intransigence. In addressing this question it emerges that certain underlying concepts are vital to our understanding of the virtues, including the idea of the unity of the virtues and a coherent teleology of the good.

It is argued that empirical enquiries into the virtues depend not only on an understanding of such underlying concepts as virtue sets and what constitutes a good life, but also on an awareness of the social structures which provide agents with their particular formulation of those concepts.

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Sakellariadis Athanassios
Farantakis Petros

Aristotle on Consciousness:
Some Remarks on the Modern Hermeneutic Tradition

Modern theorists of consciousness frequently build their own criticism on mental phenomena argumentation, according to the traditional Cartesian dichotomy between mind and body. Such a criticism despite its well-formed questioning sometimes overlooks various philosophical aspects on ancient thought especially in the Aristotelian one. The aim of this paper is to highlight aspects of the Aristotelian concept of consciousness despite the lack of the relevant Greek term. The notion of consciousness is closely connected to the idea of perception ($\alpha\check{\iota}\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$) which is in fact a crucial datum in the era of the Aristotelian thought.

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Sembou Evangelia

MacIntyre's Notions of "Practice" and "Tradition"

MacIntyre's definition of "practice" is very complicated. Moreover, it is rather vague. As he says, "the range of practices is wide: arts, sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, the making and sustaining of family life, all fall under the concept" (*AV*, p. 188). Obviously, in their lives individuals participate in a number of different practices. As practices have their "internal goods", there may be conflict between them. How does one prioritize between them?

Moreover, how conservative is MacIntyre vis-à-vis the status quo? How does one criticize specific practices? How are judgements within a "practice" disputed?

Regarding, MacIntyre's concept of "tradition", what is a "tradition"? Obviously, the notion of "tradition" does not have the sense ascribed to it by conservative political thinkers (*AV*, p. 221). Rather, in a healthy "tradition" common goals are the subject of continuous debate (*AV*, p. 222) In addition, given MacIntyre's challenge of liberalism in *After Virtue*, it is indeed surprising that in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* MacIntyre accords liberalism the status of a "tradition" (pp. 326-348).

The paper will address the above issues. Finally, the paper will consider which is MacIntyre's favourite polity. It is not a republican régime, as it has been suggested. MacIntyre's favourite state is the size of a county. It is a state which has reached its ultimate purpose (*telos*), thereby being able to provide humans with autarky (αὐτάρκεια) and happiness (εὐδαιμονία). For MacIntyre, the county is the *telos* of humanity. And, since the end of political society is the "best kind of life", the county exists "for the sake of noble actions" (καλῶν πράξεων χάριν). Accordingly, the distribution of awards and political offices in the county are made on the basis of political virtue, for only virtuous rulers can instill virtue into their fellow citizens. In MacIntyre's county the institution of the family is bolstered for, albeit a minor association, it is necessary for the purposes of reproduction and the bringing-up of the county's virtuous citizens.

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Spyrakou Eleni

J. S. Mill:
Liberty of Thought and the Limits of Society

John Stuart Mill claims that one of the first things that an organized society should short out is the compatibility between individual freedom and both public control and social intervention, since everything that makes human life valuable depends on the restriction of other people's actions, whether acting individually or collectively. Mankind is improvable by free discussion and experiments in living, and, therefore, the activities of autonomous persons which are not harmful to the interests of others should be protected within a sphere of liberty and non-interference. For this reason, individuality and autonomous choice are important components or ingredients in human well-being.

In this context, Mill argues on the fallibility of state and society in intervening with individuals' freedom of action to promote their development and protect their interests, and the role of experiments in living in enabling people to discover the most suitable forms of life for them. In this view, even eccentricity is better than massive social uniformity, because this uniformity is the consequence of fear, the dominance of customs and traditions, and the tyranny of public opinion. For this reason, liberty of thought and, consequently, liberty of discussion are vital for protecting individuality, as well as ensuring unconstrained pursuit of truth. If our beliefs and actions emerge from the critical assessment that free, uncensored debate involves, if they survive the dialectical struggle and control, then, and only then, will one be entitled to accept them as justified. However, since we are fallible, the debate must be on-going and in constant criticism of customary, uncritically acquired knowledge.

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Tegos Spyridon

The Tensions of Political Friendship in A. MacIntyre

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Theologou Kostas
Rapti Youli

On the Urge to Redefine Art
as a Novel Experience in Modern Culture

In this paper we discuss the deadlocks of defining art in modern culture. The lack of criteria and modernism revisited are of crucial issue in this account. The theoretical mainframe of our approach is founded on the Frankfurt School thinkers (Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin), and of course Jürgen Habermas. This theoretical apparatus is also attached to contemporary accounts given by Sorbonne Professor Marc Jimenez and art critic John A. Walker. The paper discusses whether fine art may survive in what forms -and to what purpose- in an age of mass media and in conditions of rapid networked communication. The paper sets off from the critical role *radical* art plays in today's divided yet global world and on the continuing debates between *high art* and *low culture,* but reflects on the interaction between art, media and technology.

To support our argument we suggest Body Art and other web/digital and technological applications in art, and the cyber-art currently being produced for the internet. The paper acknowledges the numerous interactions between art and culture in a postmodern pluralistic world. The paper draws from the vast range of contemporary works of art to illustrate theoretical points.

The introductory part surveys comprehensively the discussion, rather the debate, concerning works of art, mass culture and society and their socio-philosophical significance. The main discussion refers to the ideas and concepts on the aesthetic experience, notably expressed by Walter Benjamin and Jürgen Habermas, aptly commented by Marc Jimenez; after revealing the complexity in culture and aesthetics the argument provides an account on the 1980s cultural and political turn in aesthetics and designates the importance of communication in modern culture. The narration is enhanced by specific examples of works of art in the era of mass media, web and digital culture and underlines both the styles' pluralism and the variety of parameters affecting the interaction between art and mass media communication. Critical findings and further research suggestions conclude the paper.

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Tsinorema Stavroula

Morality, Reason and Contingency

What gives value to our evaluative universe? How can we make sense of deep moral disagreements? Can there be objective grounds for moral assessment without, in positing them, lapsing into dogmatic forms of a discredited moral ontology? In "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives", Philippa Foot has famously remarked: "We are apt to panic at the thought that we ourselves, or other people, might stop caring about the things we care about, and we feel that the categorical imperative gives us some control over the situation". What inspires the panic, for Foot, as indeed for Kant, whom she makes her direct target, is fear of a certain kind of deep contingency in what is valuable. This creates a kind of unbearable vertigo and necessitates the demand for justification. We tend to think that we have the safest foothold in the system of moral evaluation when we ask for a justification that would speak not merely to us here and now, but to any rational agents at large. The only norms that moral justification can safely presuppose, we claim, are norms of rationality. But how is moral rationality to be understood?

Answers offered in modern moral philosophy have been bound up with certain conceptions of agency. One eminent contemporary approach, which distances itself from Enlightenment universalism and invokes Aristotelian sources, argues that having a reason for action is associated with a substantive notion of there being a good that is to be related to the action. Substantive conceptions of the good may form the moral universe or "moral reality" that anchors moral agents' particular justifications. Moral reality itself may change as conceptions of the good themselves change. There is no metaphysical moral reality "out there" waiting for our responses, nor is there a substantive constraint associated with or derived from formal conditions of constructing such a reality ("Kantian constructivisms"). There are diverse moral realities associated with different conceptions of the good in different substantive conceptions of practical reasoning. The possibility, however, is open that a "better" moral reality can emerge out of competing alternative "moral traditions".

In light of the above line of approach, the focal question of the lecture centers around the following issue: Can a historically sensitive form of moral realism, one that takes into account the role of the virtues and is sensitive to the notion of dependence of moral agents to each other, be a viable alternative to the vertigo of relativism and the arbitrariness of metaphysical dogmatism? Can a conception of a tradition-constituted inquiry be the guiding thread in our

steering a course between a Scylla and a Charybdis, in our understanding of moral objectivity and moral error? In searching for an answer, a dialogue with MacIntyre's suggestive line of argument will be attempted.

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Wicks Peter

Why We Can't Get Along:
Political Debate in an Emotivist Culture

It is a commonplace observation that contemporary moral and political debate is increasingly polarized and that this is a serious problem for the health of modern democratic politics. A great deal of psychological and sociological research has been devoted to understanding the sources of polarization and we are inundated with calls to get beyond polarization. Proposals for how this is to be achieved typically enjoin us to approach debates concerning contested issues in a more constructive and respectful spirit, and often include suggestions for institutional policies and reforms that would encourage this.

My paper will examine the phenomenon of polarization in light of the analysis of emotivist culture presented by Alasdair MacIntyre in *After Virtue*. According to that analysis contemporary moral disputes derive from rationally intractable disagreements on matters of first principles, and a consequence of this is that we inhabit a culture in which the distinction between rational and non-rational persuasion has broken down. If MacIntyre's analysis is correct then while approaching moral and political debates in a more constructive spirit may make those disagreements less acrimonious – an outcome very much to be desired – there is little prospect that doing so will allow us to overcome our fundamental disagreements. MacIntyre's analysis, I will argue, offers a superior explanation of the phenomenon of polarization and the shrillness of contemporary debate. For example, the way in which those who hold opposing views are commonly denounced – as ignorant, crazy, or blinded by ideology – is better understood when the purpose of these denunciations is seen as a way of preserving the illusion that anyone who was reasoning correctly and in full possession of the relevant facts would arrive at the same conclusion. Furthermore, in calling contemporary culture emotivist MacIntyre is suggesting not simply that the distinction between rational and nonrational persuasion is not respected, but that it is a culture where our ability to respect this distinction is severely limited.

MacIntyre's is a bleak, but not a hopeless diagnosis. I will conclude by considering whether a MacIntyrean analysis of political polarization lends support to his claim that the prospects for political renewal require a refocusing of our energies

away from the politics of the nation state toward forms of community where the connection between debate and decision-making is much less tenuous.

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Zahariadis George

Modern Molecular Diagnostics and Ethical Issues When Using Archived Clinical Specimens and Something Novel is Identified

In medical science, the time between discovery and application is shortening. This is highlighted in the field of pathogen diagnosis and discovery where molecular techniques are allowing detection and identification of microbes that previously was not possible.

It is accepted practice in medicine to store patient specimens for purposes of future study. Specifically, if patient specimens exist for which a negative diagnosis was made, applying new technology may yield a positive diagnosis.

Retrospective study on patient specimens offers great scientific value. It does however raise bioethical questions, especially when a patient is living. Specific questions include:

1. Did the patient agree to future tests, not known at the time of obtaining the sample?
2. Should individual patients be asked if they want to know their new test results?
3. Or do we even need patient consent, from testing to communicating results on previously diagnosed 'negatives' - actually false negatives now?

This bioethical line of questioning occurred when faced with applying new technology on archived brain fluid specimens. Forty front line physician neuroscience specialists were surveyed asking whether new results on archived specimens should be reported, along with soliciting additional comments from them. A review of the literature was also performed to help understand how other academic and scientific centers have tried to navigate through this medical ethical dilemma.

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