

Ο Τομέας Φιλοσοφίας του Τμήματος Φιλοσοφίας, Παιδαγωγικής, Ψυχολογίας του ΕΚΠΑ και η Σχολή Ανθρωπιστικών Σπουδών του ΕΑΠ οργανώνουν διάλεξη του

Καθηγητή Φιλοσοφίας Andrew Irvine, Professor & Head of the Department of Economics, Philosophy and Political Science at the University of British Columbia (Okanagan), με θέμα

***Descartes versus Leibniz,***

την Παρασκευή, 21 Φεβρουαρίου 2014, ώρα 19:00, στο αμφιθέατρο *Δρακόπουλος*, Κεντρικό Κτήριο ΕΚΠΑ (Πανεπιστημίου 30). Σας προσκαλούμε να παραστείτε.

Abstract: Descartes believed that *eternal* truths (what we call *necessary* truths) were freely created by God. Thus rather than being bound by, say, the necessary truths of logic, God could have chosen to create other truths as the necessary truths, just as he could have chosen to create nothing at all. Leibniz disagreed. For Leibniz, necessary truths bound even God. Of course God remained all-powerful, since being all-powerful means, and can mean, nothing more than having the power to choose from among all *possible* alternatives. Today this distinction reappears in the debate between advocates of *universal possibilism*, the view that no truths are necessary, and the advocates of *limited possibilism*, the view that while some truths are necessary, no truths are necessarily necessary. The current paper defends a version of limited possibilism, arguing that while some truths are necessary, not all necessary truths are necessarily necessary.